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ABSTRACT

Many scholars have argued, over the next two decades China will rise while the
United States begins a relative decline. Today’s youth will eventually become the next
generation of leaders and policymakers. Thus, understanding youth’s perceptions of these
trends can help provide insight into how they will shape the future Sino-U.S. relationship
and their state’s standing in the world. This research found that the youth in China were
optimistic toward their country’s prospects in the international community compared to
their American counterparts. The relative optimism among the Chinese has made them
more willing to participate in global affairs and institutions compared to American youth.
Increased media exposure regarding the Sino-U.S. relationship correlated with greater
negative perceptions of their counterpart’s country between both the Americans and
Chinese. However, Americans and Chinese youth that had learned more than one
language had greater positive perceptions and willingness to cooperate with their
counterpart’s country.

Keywords: China’s rise, Sino-U.S. relationship, American hegemony, youth perceptions,
America’s decline, Multilateralism
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The complex and habitually tense relationship between the United States and
China is likely to become the most influential and consequential relationship of the 21st
century. As the world watches China’s dramatic rise and some perceive a simultaneous
decline of America, how these two superpowers react to the rapidly changing balance of
power will have substantial consequences for the stability of the international system. An
often overlooked component of this process is forecasting the beliefs and attitudes of the
next generation of policymakers and leaders from both sides. Understanding and
comparing the attitudes of today’s youth in China and the United States can provide a
window to predicting how both countries will interact by the time the this generation sets
the prevailing ideology for policy formation. Amidst a perceived shift in global power,
Chinese youth are relatively optimistic regarding China’s ascent, and American youth are
pessimistic regarding America’s decline. These perceptions are reflected in the shift of
Chinese youth toward an outward, international focus in China’s policies, while
American youth shift toward an inward, domestic focus. That is to say, American youth
have a greater interest in domestic policies relative to their interest in global military
engagements while Chinese youth are more willing to increase China’s global role. As
they begin shifting into leadership and policy making roles, youth on both sides have the
potential to reshape the policies of their countries with these newfound perceptions. At
1

the same time, both sides’ youth are committed to preserving bilateral
cooperation, even though their priorities are significantly different. This research suggests
that increasing multilingual education among the youth would improve the relationship
between the United States and China. Chinese and American youth that learned more
than one language were more willing to cooperate with the other side’s country and had
more positive overall perceptions toward their counterpart’s country. However, simply
increasing knowledge regarding the other side is ineffective to maintain the bilateral
relationship. Greater exposure to media that covered the Sino-U.S. relationship increased
negative perceptions of the other side’s country among both Chinese and American
youth.
Youth Significance
Youth, which this research defines people between 18 to 25 years old, are often
overlooked in the study of Sino-U.S. relations and international affairs in general, but
their potential contributions to the makeup of the relationship and their inevitable shaping
of the future are nonetheless significant. In the past, youth have significantly impacted
the way their communities think and act (Yohalem and Martin 809-810). In turn, this
influence provides an avenue for youth to impact how older generations think about
foreign policy and shape their attitudes toward China or America. For example, in China
there is an increasing frequency of political demonstrations in which young people are
playing a crucial part (Ash 44). In a system without competitive democratic elections,
Chinese youth haves till found ways to project their voice -- especially in the era of social
media. Several outcries over social media have led to changes in official government
policy (Qiu 2009). As social media and independent publishers continue to gain traction
2

with Chinese citizens, the influence of the Chinese public on its officials will likely grow.
According to Maria Repnikova, “Once public opinion matures…it might play a more
active role as a direct feedback mechanism” (Repnikova).
While American youth are also limited in their scale of influence, it is important
not to overlook the role they play in current foreign policy discussions. Placing the youth
in the context of the current U.S. political sphere paints a bleak picture for its
engagement, where 63 percent of young people have said they “rarely or never discuss”
politics (Kahne and Middaugh 55). At the same time, like in China, there have been
outbursts of widespread youth engagement, such as the Occupy Wall Street movement
(Nichols 5), or more recently protests over police brutality. As such, even though youth
political participation is on average relatively low, issue-based political movements are
still often lead by youth, and the intensity of those youth who do participate is quite high.
When crafting foreign policy, presidents are known to be at least partially
sensitive to public preferences (Knecht 204-205). The Kony 2012 campaign, largely
driven by youth on social media, offers a unique example of how youth influenced the
Obama administration’s foreign policy with Uganda. Most significantly, presidents are
most sensitive to the views of public opinion regarding conflict and the decision to go to
war (Knecht 209). With China’s rise and increasing territorial claims creating the
potential specter of conflict, the way in which the public -- and youth specifically -- view
China is an important factor to consider when predicting whether the president will ever
choose to engage in war or increase troop deployment in the Asia-Pacific.
Chinese Political Engagement

3

The youth’s potential ability to affect foreign policy should be analyzed in the
context of their current levels of political engagement. There is a sense that the current
generation of China is not particularly interested in politics, and many Chinese youth are
apathetic toward the government (Ash 43). Moreover, the pursuit of material possessions
often trumps politics in importance for many Chinese youth (Ash 43). This is not
unexpected in a system that does not provide direct elections for central authorities, and
any elections that occur are systematically manipulated by the Communist Party (Zhang
and Lin 23).
However, there are two reasons why the perception of youth apathy in China does
not undermine their significance over the short and long term. First, Chinese students feel
generally dissatisfied with their occupations, or lack thereof, and feel increasingly
entitled to political rights (Ash 44). As China struggles to maintain the rapid levels of
growth as it has in the past, this could give rise to a younger generation that is
increasingly resentful of China’s political system and slowing economic conditions.
Second, the apathy of today’s youth does not necessarily indicate that they will remain
this way in the future. Many Chinese youth are instructed by their parents to “leave
politics alone.” However, with the greater independence that accompanies adulthood,
growing resentment could undermine this family-taught apolitical philosophy.
American Political Engagement
Many people harbor a similar concern regarding American youth’s lack of
political engagement. A lack of youth political participation now suggests to some that
the general population in the future may have less impact on shaping foreign policy if
apathy takes hold. According to Kahne and Middaugh, over half of Americans under 30
4

were disinterested in politics, and 63 percent rarely talk about politics with others face to
face (55). Moreover, less than half of people between the ages 18 and 25 voted in 2012
(“Youth”). However, research suggests that this apathy among many young voters is
temporary and that they will become more active once they enter adulthood (Flanagan
and Levine 161). Furthermore, young adults are more civically engaged than adults in
certain areas, such as global activism (Flanagan and Levine 162). This delay theory
suggests that over the long term the current generation will eventually increase its
political activism and will focus on international issues in particular.
Attitude Shaping
In order to fully understand the perceptions of American and Chinese youth, it is
important to also understand the underlying reasons how and why their attitudes have
been shaped this way. In a broad sense, across cultures an intergenerational value shift is
usually triggered by a change in the security, economic, and political conditions of a
given country (Niv-Solomon 10). For instance, if the population believes their country is
secure militarily, the next generation is more likely to prioritize economic development.
If the population’s economic needs are met, a society may focus more heavily on “postmaterialist” values, like environmental protection and civil rights (Niv-Solomon 10). The
idea of the “transmission belt,” which states that older generations’ views are embedded
in the minds of younger generations’ views, is invalidated under this theory (NivSolomon 14). In essence, each generation’s value system is shaped primarily by their
unique experiences and independent learning during their childhood, rather than by their
parents (Niv-Solomon 14). This realization is important because it means that the next
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generation of leaders will not be merely a photocopy of the current generation in power,
but rather one that was shaped by its own problems and cultural influences.
Chinese Attitude Shaping
Chinese youth are inundated with an array of inputs that shape their perception of
domestic and foreign affairs. The Communist Chinese Party has attempted to ensure that
the traditional modes of influence continue to shape the youth in a way that is favorable
to the one-party state. The CCP Propaganda Department, or Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu,
censors an array of different mediums and transmits information that is favorable to the
state (Shambaugh 27-29). The primary mechanism for censorship is through “selfdiscipline,” which relies on individuals to personally refrain from posting controversial
commentary. “Self-discipline” has become an effective form of indirect suppression since
many in China have internalized this self-censorship (Shambaugh 29; Wallis 420). There
are two “traditional” mediums that the CCP utilizes to disseminate its message to youth:
education and mass media.
First, after the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, the Chinese began mandating
political education classes in schools to improve attitudes toward the state and move the
youth away from Westernized political systems (Shengluo 14). In a study that reviewed
various factors influencing students’ ideologies, political education classes were the least
or nearly the least influential, yet they still led students to have a higher affinity for the
state than they would have otherwise (Shengluo 27, 33). Second, the CCP has “guided”
public opinion for decades through mass media platforms, such as traditional newscasts
and news outlets (Luo 1290). These platforms have effectively increased public regard of
the CCP and its policies (Luo 1290). Both of these propaganda mechanisms have come
6

under assault by new forms of media that allow non-state entities to set the agenda.
Especially among those in urban areas, a decreasing number of Chinese citizens are
susceptible to propaganda from state agencies (Shambaugh 55). As a result, the power to
influence public opinion has shifted from the CCP and toward independent media and
social media platforms that often exercise autonomy from the state (Luo 1294).
While the CCP still has substantial influence over public opinion, it must now
compete with the rest of the Internet (Luo 1307). Text messaging, anonymizing tools,
such as VPNs, and other workarounds have given youth activists a space to challenge the
CCP’s narrative and influence the attitudes of other youth (Wallis 420, 422). While
unsuccessful, the attempted “Jasmine Revolution,” which was a series of Arab Spring
inspired pro-democracy protests throughout China, demonstrates the power of youth in
subverting the Great Firewall (Zhang and Nyiri 124). Over time, these attitudes toward
the government will likely carry over into adulthood -- at least in the sense that the youth
are better able to freely form their beliefs outside the control of the state.
American Attitude Shaping
Similar to Chinese youth, American youth also have an abundance of inputs
constantly competing to influence their attitudes and perceptions. In the early years of a
child’s development of their political beliefs, parental ideology plays a prominent role
(Hatemi et al. 1151). However, parental influence over their child’s political ideology
diminishes over time, especially as they move into young adulthood (Hatemi et al. 1151).
With the ascent of the Internet, other traditional mechanisms of spreading political ideas
have declined in the United States. For example, civic education in the United States has
been less frequently taught in the public education system (CIRCLE 14). This helps
7

demonstrate how difficult it is for the American government to directly shape the
attitudes of the current generation through the public school system. In the past, mediums
like broadcast radio played a role in creating “ideological synthesis,” whereas opinions
were relatively aligned among the youth (Yang 22), yet radio use has also declined
precipitously.
The vacuum left by old modes of influence has largely been filled by social
media. About 41 percent of youth have been found to have participated in online political
activities (Kahne and Middaugh 52). Youth’s participation in online social media a
“collective unconscious” has emerged (Yang 18). Yang describes this “collective
unconscious” as the multiplicity of individual messages that all culminate in creating one
informal discourse (18). It is through this discourse that the will of youth can be
manifested in challenging dominant ideologies (Yang 18).
Future Impact
While the current perceptions of youth toward foreign policy may have an impact
on the current formulation of policy, as outlined above, this paper’s primary concern will
be analyzing their current attitudes to predict future policies. According to Niv-Solomon,
the youth are likely to maintain many of their current beliefs as they transition into
adulthood (13). In fact, once people enter adulthood, they are much less likely to alter
their political attitudes and beliefs (Niv-Solomon 14). That is, it is likely that the attitudes
of today’s youth will be the same general attitudes they harbor in adulthood; it is also
likely that these attitudes will become increasingly rigid over time. For this reason,
analyzing youth’s current perceptions can provide researchers with a reasonable
prediction of how policy may be formulated in the future. Thus, this paper will draw
8

broad conclusions about how these comparative perceptions of U.S. and Chinese youth,
as the likely framework for future policy making, will influence the direction of the SinoAmerican relationship and the actions of the US and China as individual states.
The specific commitment levels of American and Chinese youth toward their
political attitudes throughout their lives may be one limitation of this study; The
commitment toward these beliefs represent an important area for future study to
determine precisely how reliable current opinions of youth can be for predicting future
perceptions. Moreover, the intensity of the youth’s beliefs and how likely they are to
lobby for their preferred policies are beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, NivSolomon’s research indicates that opinion samples of the youth can still provide valuable
insight into understanding the policy effects of this generation’s perceptions.
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CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

The data below stem from a year-long survey process that began with a series of
focus groups in Beijing, China. Responses from the Chinese focus groups are separate
from the statistics which illustrate the results of an online survey. Focus group responses
provided alongside the survey data are intended to give human context to the data. These
focus group responses were translated with the assistance of a native Chinese speaker.
The focus groups were conducted over two months and consisted of three separate groups
of five participants each, for a total of 15 participants. The focus group participants were
asked a series of open-ended questions about their perceptions of the future of the United
States and China. The direction of the questions for each of the groups varied based on
the answers of the particular focus group. The focus group data is a convenience sample;
all participants were Beijing Normal University (BNU) students between 18-25 years old
and were citizens of the People’s Republic of China. Respondents were selected with the
help of BNU School of Politics and International Relations Vice Dean Shengjun Zhang
and his graduate assistant Xiwen Li, who contacted individuals they knew at BNU. All
respondents were compensated with $10 USD. The initial purpose of the focus groups
was to provide a direction for constructing the subsequent survey questions, as it
provided a framework to test if the perceptions of the focus groups were representative
among a larger group. Additionally, it was useful in providing the ability to cross10

examine the participants and comprehensively understand their views prior to
constructing the survey questions. While the data from the focus group are not
necessarily intended to be nationally representative of the youth in China, BNU attracts
students from across the mainland which should provide enough diversity to derive the
subsequent survey questions.
For the survey, all respondents were also between 18-25 years old in order to
represent the stage of youth prior to full adulthood, but also the stage when most political
opinions have already been formed. This age range serves as the definition of “youth” for
both the Chinese and American data. All survey respondents were citizens of the People’s
Republic of China or the United States. Chinese students received a survey with both
English and Chinese versions of the questions. The survey questions were derived from
the focus group answers and were not the same as those given to the focus group.
Translations of the questions were reviewed by native Chinese speakers. All of the
questions can be reviewed in full, in Chinese and English, in the appendix below. Several
methods were employed to collect data, but the bulk of data was retrieved from two
services: Qualtrics and MTurk for Chinese and American responses respectively. These
services help individuals find qualified participants for their surveys.
Other methods to collect survey data included Facebook promotion on pages
related to international clubs to attract both Chinese and American respondents, as well as
promotion on Facebook groups for Chinese citizens. In the United States, participants
were entered into a raffle to win a $50 gift card if they took the survey, and this was
promoted through posters around the campus at Western Kentucky University. In total,
there were 141 Chinese responses and 150 American responses, with varying response
11

levels for each question since respondents could opt not to answer all of the questions.
This is a convenience sample, as it was promoted through available channels that did not
necessarily formulate a nationally representative sample. However, the survey data still
comes from an array of regions throughout both the United States and China as reflected
in the IP data that accompanied the survey data. This was accomplished through
promotion of the survey in several regions in both countries, and through the Qualtrics
and MTurk purchases, which received responses from a variety of locations in both
countries. Incorporating a variety of regions helps ensure the data is not regionally biased
even though it is a convenience sample.
Some responses in the survey data were omitted if they were not citizens of the
target country, were not in the proper age range, or if they did not pass focus questions.
Focus questions required respondents to demonstrate that they were fully reading the
questions and answers, and if they failed the question all of their responses were flagged
and deleted. For example, participants were asked to choose “very likely” if they were
paying attention. If they chose any other answer, all of their responses were manually
removed and they were immediately booted from the survey. To ensure compliance with
the required demographics of the survey, responses which showed an IP address outside
of the United States or China were flagged and the respondents were contacted to provide
proof of citizenship. If there was no contact information, they did not respond or could
not produce proper identification, their responses were deleted from survey data.
Limitations
One limitation of this data is that it more likely reflects relatively affluent Chinese
youth. This is due to the fact that affluent youth have greater access to the Internet, which
12

is necessary to participate in the online survey. This may distort the data toward affluent
Chinese youth views. For instance, affluent youth may be more willing to prioritize the
environment over a government safety net than less affluent youth. However, less
affluent Chinese youth without access to the Internet will likely have less influence over
policy discussions than affluent youth that do have access. These limitations may exist
for American data as well, however the skew is likely smaller since the disparity in
Internet access in the United States is not as dramatic.
Another limitation of this survey exists in questions regarding language
proficiency. The survey may be unrepresentative of the actual percentages of individuals
that study a second language. In the United States, 21 percent of Americans say they are
speak a language other than English at home (Camarota and Zeigler), whereas 45 percent
of American youth in this survey report learning a foreign language. In China, around
one-third of the country is learning English alone (Brock), whereas 85 percent of Chinese
youth in this survey were language learners. However, this discrepancy does not account
for generational differences or the amount of other second languages the Chinese may be
learning. Additionally, these high percentages of language learners may be influenced by
a high number of college student participation in the survey, since many colleges require
or encourage studying a foreign language. As will be discussed, second language learning
correlates with a change in attitudes. Thus, this data may be skewed by the high amounts
of language learners in both groups. Moreover, this data cannot account for reverse
causality regarding the impact of language learning on perceptions of other countries.
The primary limitations of this data are the relatively small sample sizes to the
overall youth populations in both states and that they are both convenience samples. Even
13

with these limitations, the diversity in where the responses originated, as well as the
variety of methods of promotion should allow the results to provide preliminary insight
into gauging the perceptions of youth in China and America. In particular, even with a
small convenience sample, this data should still be large enough to provide contrast in the
general leanings of both sides’ perceptions.
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CHAPTER 3

GENERAL MUTUAL ATTITUDES

A Potential Challenger
Between the overall populations in China and the United States, the general
perceptions between both sides illustrate many of the difficulties and opportunities for the
Sino-U.S. relationship in the status quo. The following research provides a window into
the current attitudes between the overall population and government officials to provide a
potential comparison point for the attitudes amongst these countries’ youth.
For Americans, the Chinese government and the country as a whole elicit a wide
range of responses. Since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, however, positive
attitudes toward China have not recovered, as America’s view of China has slowly turned
negative over the years (Dugan; Perlez). At the same time, many Americans have already
come to see China as the leading global economic power (Dugan). While it would appear
that these tendencies combined may fuel a pushback against the rise of China, more
Americans reported seeing China as a friend than as a foe (Dugan). Nonetheless, the
attitude of many in the U.S. military is to view China as a potential challenger and thus
feel it necessary to contain their rise (Li 1). Coupled with the narrative of China taking
away American jobs, a negative portrayal of China has emerged in much of American
media (Perlez). In fact, Pan argues the emerging paradigm toward China in the United
15

States is defined by the “China Threat” theory, particularly since the demise of the
Soviet Union (23-24). That is, Pan argues China has been discursively constructed by
American analysts as a threat to the American dominated world order and its
accompanying stability.
Many analysts in and outside of government believe that the United States and
China are locked in a power struggle for control of the international system. Friedberg
explains that the current rivalry is not just about misperceptions, but rather the structure
of the international system itself (18). China’s status as an authoritarian regime, and
America’s status as a democratic system also fuels distrust between both governments
(Friedberg 21). This chasm in their government systems creates an impediment to longterm cooperation between the two countries (Friedberg 21). Even though many elites in
both countries believe China and the United States are tense “competitors,” only a
minority of government elites in both countries go so far as to label the other side an
“enemy” (“U.S.-China” 10-11). However, substantially more Chinese government elites
than U.S. government elites labeled the other side an enemy, at 27 percent and 2 percent
respectively (“U.S.-China” 11).
Contradictory feelings among the Chinese public and governmental elite are
abound. On one hand, the Chinese are impressed by American culture, especially movies
and music (NCUSCR). At the same time, many are alienated by U.S. foreign policy,
which they see as the United States acting as the world’s police (NCUSCR). On a
governmental level, China is intent on deciphering the underlying strategy of the U.S.
government (Nathan and Scobell). In all, in recent years the Communist Party tends to
view U.S. actions in East Asia as a form of containment by a “capitalist” power (Nathan
16

and Scobell). The military establishment in China takes a similar hardline stance as its
American military counterpart. Military strategists often recommend that China should
take a more confrontational position against U.S. policies they see as holding back
China’s rise (Nathan and Scobell). For example, U.S. support for Taiwan and other
policies are seen through this lens (Nathan and Scobell). This animosity has resulted in
Chinese governmental elites being far more likely than the Chinese public to label the
United States an “enemy” (“U.S.-China” 11). Moreover, Chinese elites are even much
more likely than American elites to label their counterpart an “enemy” (“U.S.-China”
11). As such, it appears that mistrust is more deeply embedded on the Chinese side than it
is on the American side, meaning that American foreign policymakers have to be
especially cautious in how their policies toward China will be perceived. Interestingly,
the data from the Carnegie Endowment suggests youth in both countries were more
reflective of scholars’ higher level of trust toward the other country (“U.S.-China” 9).
Comparisons and Implications
The general mutual perceptions of Chinese and American illustrates some areas of
concern and optimism for the bilateral relationship:


Chinese and American youth largely refuse to label their counterpart a partner or
an enemy



Both sides label each other their biggest threat, but American youth’s perception
of threat is far more diffuse than Chinese youth



Strong majorities of both are willing to increase bilateral economic cooperation
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Americans are hesitant to increase bilateral military cooperation, while a strong
majority of Chinese are willing to increase military cooperation



Substantial amounts of Chinese and American youth think their counterpart will
use military force

FIGURE 1:
IS THE US/CHINA A PARTNER OR
ENEMY
Chinese Youth (n=127)

PARTNER

15%
NEITHER

10%

49%
24%

36%

66%

American Youth (n=127)

ENEMY

When labeling their counterpart a partner or an enemy, Chinese and American
youth have a similar trend. What stands out is the large portion of both sides that chose to
label them neither a partner nor enemy (see figure 1). This has a few explanations. For
the Chinese youth, this potentially illustrates a “Golden Mean,” or zhongyong approach
among the Chinese youth in its perception of the United States. The Golden Mean is
Confucian ideal that is meant to convey a balance between two extremes (Xiao and
Carlson 203). This ideal has already been incorporated into aspects of China’s foreign
policy toward the United States (Xiao and Carlson 203), and this framework may have
trickled down to the Chinese youth as well. In fact, Chinese youth are even more likely to
take the “Golden Mean” approach regarding foreign policy than the broader public. A
2013 Pew study found that 31 percent of the Chinese public thought the United States
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had neither a cooperative nor a hostile relationship with China (Horowitz et al. 13). This
accounts for nearly half of the Chinese youth in this survey.
On the American side, similar results were found among the general public in the
Pew survey and youth in this survey: majorities of both chose “neither” when classifying
China as a partner or enemy (Horowitz et al. 26). And, youth in this survey were also
consistent with the general public when labeling China an enemy as well, as both the
general public and youth in this survey were mostly reticent about using this label
(Horowitz et al. 26). However, both Pew and this survey found that American youth are
more likely than the general public to label China a partner (Horowitz et al. 26; “U.S.
Public”).
It is important to note that differences between the 2012 Pew survey, the question
was worded to include the label of competitor in addition to partner and enemy (“U.S.
Public”). With this addition, majorities among all ages chose to label China as a
competitor (“U.S. Public”). The lack of “competitor” as an option in this survey may
have caused American youth to label China as an “enemy” instead. This research chose
the 2013 Pew survey as the framework, which did not include competitor as an option
because it forced the respondents to either respond in stark terms, partner or enemy, or
place China in neither category. That is to say, individuals that have substantially
different views toward China may both choose competitor. As such, this framework
forces respondents to articulate which direction their feelings lean, and if they truly lean
in neither direction then that is reflected though “neither.”
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Figure 2: (C) China's Biggest Threat
N=118 states/entities mentioned
North Korea
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32%

America
58%

While the majority of Chinese youth refused to label the United States an outright
“enemy,” the majority of them still listed the United States as the biggest threat to China
(see figure 2). Japan was the second most listed, but with about half the number of the
United States. This is significant considering the China’s history with Japan and their
current tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Besides Japan and the United States,
all other countries were far down the list. Some listed two or more countries as the
biggest threat, and these numbers reflect every instance of a country being mentioned.
The Chinese focus group sessions suggest that these numbers reflect animosity toward
U.S. foreign policy in East Asia, as this is perceived by many Chinese youth to be
targeted at China. One focus participant said “America should control its army and stop
spreading it around the world.” Several others indicated that the United States should not
interfere in the dispute over Taiwan.
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Figure 3: (A) America's Biggest Threat
N=180 states/entities mentioned
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On the American side, a large number of American youth perceive China as the
biggest threat to the United States. This widespread perception illustrates that the China
threat theory criticized by Pan is at least somewhat accepted by American youth (see
figure 3). This is consistent with the general population, 40 percent of which labeled
China a threat in the 2012 Chicago Council study (“Global Views” 6). The Chicago
Council question differed somewhat from this survey. It asked whether or not China was
a threat in general, while this survey asked respondents to only list the greatest threat.
This was to gauge the seriousness with which respondents view specific threats.
Although China is seen as the biggest state threat, overall American youth see the
threats to the United States as diffuse. China essentially ties Russia in number of
mentions among the youth in this survey. Other states like North Korea and Iran were
also mentioned frequently in this survey. Russia’s prominence on this particular survey
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may be influenced by the recent events in Eastern Europe, since much of the data
collection took place during the ongoing dispute in Ukraine.
Despite hesitancy among both groups in labeling their counterpart an enemy, both
sides’ youth labelled the other side their country’s greatest threat. However, Chinese
youth were substantially more likely to label the United States a threat than American
youth were to give China the same label. The diffuse threats for Americans seems to
indicate that in the coming years American youth will feel compelled to concentrate on
several different threats at once, making it less likely that they will focus on China’s
foreign policy specifically. For their part, Chinese youth have a strong focus on the
foreign policy of the United States, as their labeling of the United States as a threat seems
to suggest. If the U.S. stokes a nationalist sentiment among this generation of Chinese
youth through a controversial foreign policy decision now or in the future, it may initiate
a worsening of bilateral ties. This is especially true if the Chinese government feels
compelled to acquiesce to the nationalist pressure to preserve its legitimacy.

FIGURE 4:
LIKELIHOOD OTHER COUNTRY (US/CHINA)
USES MILITARY FORCE
84%

Chinese Youth (n=140)

SOMEWHAT - VERY UNLIKELY
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American Youth (n=146)

UNDECIDED
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SOMEWHAT - VERY LIKELY

One explanation for this threat perception is that the vast majority of Chinese
youth and a plurality of American youth think the other is at least somewhat likely to use
military force to achieve their national goals (see figure 4). This is an area of concern for
the bilateral relationship as this perception could easily precipitate miscalculation over
the long-term. At the same time, future events are likely to further shape the perception of
threat for both sides, since neither clearly labeled the other a partner or an enemy,
meaning that threat perceptions could change quickly and drastically. For example,
escalated tensions over the status of Taiwan, then the threat perception of U.S. and
Chinese youth will change accordingly. Alternatively, greater cooperation over an issue
such as climate change may lower mutual mistrust and shift perceptions in a positive
direction. That is to say, it appears that American and Chinese youth will remain
somewhat malleable in their perceptions of the bilateral relationship and immediate
perceptions will be shaped more so by specific events.

FIGURE 5:
YOUR COUNTRY SHOULD INCREASE
ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH US/CHINA
Chinese Youth (n=103)
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Avoiding tension as emphasized by the Golden Mean framework can be
illustrated in the significant amount of Chinese youth in favor of cooperation with the
United States in the economic realm (see figure 5). American youth as a whole were
much less enthusiastic about economic cooperation relative to their Chinese counterparts.
However, a majority of American youth still at least somewhat agreed with the idea. This
suggest that economics is an area where bilateral cooperation can be relatively successful.
High levels of economic integration between both sides, and both sides apparent
willingness to cooperate economically can help to solidify a strong bilateral relationship
through increased economic interdependence.

FIGURE 6:
YOUR COUNTRY SHOULD INCREASE
MILITARY COOPERATION WITH US/CHINA
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In the military realm, Chinese youth were almost just as enthusiastic about the
prospect of cooperating with the United States as they were in the economic realm. This
is a notable finding considering their view of the United States as the biggest threat to
China (see figure 6). This data illustrates that in spite of some suspicions toward the
United States, Chinese youth are not necessarily letting their suspicions influence their
willingness to cooperate. This is an important development when comparing these views
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to the current attitudes held by the military establishment, which appears to take a more
hardline stance than the Chinese youth surveyed in this study. American youth, though,
are far more hesitant, with a plurality disagreeing with the idea of Sino-American military
cooperation. Even though the majority of American youth do not explicitly view China as
an enemy, is clear from their wariness to cooperate militarily that many implicitly believe
it resembles an enemy. That is, if China was not seen in some way as an enemy or
antagonistic toward the United States then one would expect more Americans to support
military cooperation.

Media Exposure and Perceptions

FIGURE 7: IS THE US A PARTNER OR
ENEMY BASED ON MEDIA EXPOSURE
Chinese Frequent Media Viewers (n=24)
Chinese Infrequent Media Viewers (n=24)
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For both Chinese and American youth, exposure to Sino-American relationship
focused media correlated with negative feelings toward the other country (see figure 7).
Among Chinese youth, those that were frequent media consumers, meaning they reported
they keep up with news about the bilateral relationship at least daily, were more likely to
label the United States an enemy than overall Chinese youth. Chinese youth who
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infrequent media consumers, meaning they reported they follow Sino-U.S. relations once
a month or less made up about 21 percent of all respondents. Not a single infrequent
media consumer from the Chinese group labelled the United States an enemy. Infrequent
media consumers among Chinese youth also labeled the United States a partner slightly
more than the overall youth and significantly more than frequent consumers.
In essence, the more Chinese youth are exposed to the media, the more negative
their perception became of the United States. This suggests there exists a significant
negative bias in Chinese state media toward the United States. Even with a potential
negative bias, media exposure did not significantly impact whether Chinese youth were
willing to cooperate with the United States either in the economic or military realm, as
the percentages in all three groups were largely the same in these categories. One
explanation for this dichotomy is that Chinese media whips up nationalist sentiment
through negative portrayals of U.S. foreign policy, but then tempers those feelings by
emphasizing the necessity of the bilateral relationship.
One focus group member retained skepticism of the media, though, indicating she
“doesn’t know if media is the truth.” This sentiment reflects Shambaugh’s discussion of
Chinese increasingly rejecting the media’s message (55), which may account for why the
majority of Chinese youth indicated they are not daily consumers of media. Nonetheless,
it appears that if the message of the CCP is casting a negative light on the United States,
it is effective in shaping the opinions of those exposed to it.
American youth exposure to Sino-U.S. related media had a very similar result.
American youth that were frequent media consumers, meaning they kept up with SinoAmerican relationship related media at least two to three times a week made up 20
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percent of respondents. These frequent media consumers were much more likely to label
China an enemy than infrequent media consumers and slightly more likely than the
overall youth (see figure 8).

FIGURE 8: IS CHINA A PARTNER OR
ENEMY BASED ON MEDIA EXPOSURE
American Frequent Media Viewers (n=27)
American Infrequent Media Viewers (n=24)
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Infrequent media consumers, or those that kept up with Sino-American related
media once a month or less, made up 24 percent of American respondents. The vast
majority of infrequent media consumers chose not to label China an enemy or partner.
While frequent media consumers were slightly more likely to label China a partner, this
is possibly explained by the vast majority of infrequent consumers choosing “neither.”
Moreover, frequent media consumers labeled China “partner” about on par with the
overall youth. Overall, this seems to suggest that an increased frequency of consuming
Sino-U.S. related media seems to cause a shift from labeling China “neither” to labeling
them an “enemy.”
One explanation is that frequent media consumers were more than twice as likely
as infrequent consumers to believe China will use military force. This provides credence
to Pan’s view that U.S. media subtly builds an anti-China narrative. Still, like the
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Chinese, media exposure did not have a significant effect on whether American youth
believed the United States should increase cooperation with China in the economic or
military realm. In all, heightened exposure to media related to the bilateral relationship is
not an effective method to improve mutual perceptions.
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CHAPTER 4

MILITARY AND ECONOMIC FUTURE

First among Equals
One of the defining debates of the Twenty First Century thus far has been
predicting the extent of the upcoming shifts of power in the international system. Many
analysts question the ability of the United States to retain its military and economic
strength relative to China. At the same time, optimists of American strength just as
forcefully argue that America will not be overtaken by China in the near future. And a
range of opinions exist somewhere in between.
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) estimates that the United States’
economy will be superseded by China as soon as the 2020s (98). Recent estimates predict
2024 as the year when China will have the largest nominal gross domestic product (IHS).
The NIC predicts that the rise of China and other powers will effectively end America’s
“unipolar moment” of unmatched global hegemony (98). While the NIC predicts that the
U.S. military will retain its superiority into 2030, this advantage will also fade as other
states begin to catch up (99). At the same time, China will continue to increase its defense
spending while the United States is forced to contend with a large debt-to-GDP ratio
(Layne 22, 27). Layne argues these simultaneous trends will make it difficult for the
United States to retain its status as world hegemon (30). Alternatively, the NIC indicates
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that even in a more multipolar world, the United States will retain a status of “first
among equals” (98).
A more optimistic analysis for U.S. preeminence finds that the United States is
likely to preserve most of its current economic and military strength relative to China
(Beckley 50, 75). Beckley predicts that China will face greater economic disruptions in
the coming years due to a demographic shift which will create a drop-off in the labor
market and ultimately crimp China’s growth (61). For Beckley, it is also unlikely that the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s military, will overtake the U.S. military. He
contends that funding for the U.S. military produces more force-projecting power per
dollar than equivalent investments in China’s PLA, and thus this multiplier disparity will
be difficult for China to overcome (Beckley 74).
With this wide range of opinions, it is important to understand how these types of
views, like Beckley’s and Layne’s, have been perceived among the youth populations in
both countries, as the perceptions of the American population toward China is likely to
have an influence crafting policies in the future (Niv-Solomon 13-14). Beckley argues
that these perceptions have the potential to both help and harm the United States (77-78).
For example, fear of China’s economic and military ascent may translate into policies
that increase tension and increase the likelihood of conflict (Beckley 77). These include
greater trade and immigration restrictions, which would strangle U.S. economic growth
and actually help to facilitate America’s decline (Beckley 77). Alternatively, the
perception of America’s decline may also lead to the adoption of policies that strengthen
America’s position (Beckley 77). Beckley provides the parallel of fears toward the Soviet
Union, which induced the creation of the interstate highway system (77) and the
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technological advances from the space race. Either way, it is important to understand the
direction of these perceptions and what policies may spring up as a result.
Comparisons and Implications
On nearly every measure, Chinese youth project higher confidence about China’s
prospects for the next two decades than American youth project about the United States’
prospects. American youth tended to believe that the United States was in decline, while
simultaneously believing that China was ascending as the world’s new superpower.
Overall, the Chinese youth largely had the same predictions for the next two decades as
American youth. The following results illustrate that while American and Chinese youth
predictions for the future are similar, their optimism toward their country are starkly
different:


Majorities of Chinese and American youth believe China is at least somewhat
likely to become the world’s leading superpower



A majority of American youth think the U.S. will significantly decline in the next
two decades



Chinese youth are less inclined than Americans to believe the United States will
decline
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Chinese Youth (n=140)
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FIGURE 9:
LIKELIHOOD CHINA BECOMES LEADING
SUPERPOWER

UNDECIDED

SOMEWHAT - VERY LIKELY

When asked whether China would become the leading superpower within the next
two decades, majorities of American and Chinese youth said this was at least somewhat
likely (see figure 9). This indicates that the narrative of China’s ascent has been absorbed
by the youth. The perception that China will become the leading superpower may be
interlinked with how the youth evaluate the economic situations in both states. Large
majorities of American and Chinese youth believe China will surpass the United States’
economy in the next two decades.
Compared to the strength of their belief that China will surpass America’s
economy, Chinese youth were less inclined to predict that China’s military will become
the strongest in the next two decades, although a slim majority still did. Americans were
also split on this question. In turn, youth on both sides seem to be predicting that the bulk
of China’s influence will come from its economic rather than military might.
Nonetheless, even as China’s economy grows many Chinese youth recognize this will not
necessarily mean China will be dominant in every economic indicator. One focus
participant said “In quantity China will surpass the United States, but on average we will
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be still poor.” That is to say, the per capita income of China is likely to remain far below
the United States for some time.

FIGURE 10:
LIKELIHOOD OF SIGNIFICANT US DECLINE
Chinese Youth (n=138)
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A majority of American youth also agreed that the United States would
significantly decline over the next two decades (see figure 10). American youth were in
fact more inclined to believe the United States is in decline than the Chinese youth, only
a plurality of which agreed with this statement. Moreover, a much larger majority of
Chinese youth believed their country will become the leading superpower than thought
the U.S. will significantly decline. This seems to suggest that a portion of Chinese youth
expect a bipolar or multipolar structure of the global power system, with America
maintaining much of its power, but with China also gaining substantial strength. One
focus group participant put the scenario as follows: “China wants to balance against
America’s hegemony for world peace.” Beliefs about the current global perceptions of
both country’s foreign policy may be influencing these predictions, as a majority of
Chinese youth believe the world looks fondly upon their country’s foreign policy, while a
majority of Americans believe just the opposite. As a result, the Chinese youth may
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believe they have wider latitude to act on the international stage then their American
counterparts.
This overall greater pessimism on the American side coincides with narratives in
China and the United States that emphasize the two countries relative ascent and decline.
This confirms that the pessimism among that Beckley cautions against has trickled down
into American youth. However, this finding leaves the question asked by Beckley still
unanswered: how will the pessimism of American youth and the optimism of Chinese
youth translate into policy?
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CHAPTER 5

CHINESE AND AMERICAN PRIORITIES

Security Discourse
The priorities of China’s and America’s youth are intimately intertwined with the
security discourse of both states. Traditionally, security has been narrowly conceptualized
so as to concentrate only on military security (Inglehart and Norris 91). However, this
definition is broadened to include human security as states develop and are exposed to
longer periods of peace (Inglehart and Norris 91). In essence, if there is a “scarcity” of
human security relative to military security, the former receives greater prioritization by
society. The human security priorities outlined by Inglehart and Norris include protecting
the environment and protecting human rights (Inglehart and Norris 92). This framework
put forward by Inglehart and Norris illustrates why growing up in particular political
contexts alters the policy priorities of a state’s youth.
Current Priorities
Among Chinese elites, there is currently a debate over China’s future and what
goals to prioritize internally and externally. There is a serious discussion as to whether
China should expand its presence overseas through establishing a greater number of
military bases and alliances (NIC 63). How China prioritizes its foreign policy focus in
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the coming years will likely determine their status as a global superpower as well (NIC
63).
Domestically, China is witnessing a similar transition in public opinion and
government policy as the United States experienced in the 1960s (Gardner). Attitudes
regarding environmental policy are beginning to shift away from prioritizing economic
growth at the expense of the environment (Gardner). From 2008 to 2013 the number of
Chinese adults that rated air pollution a “very big problem” jumped from 31 percent to 47
percent (Gardner). As a result, the Chinese government has instituted a range of
environmental protection measures as part of its “war on pollution” (Gardner). When
asked explicitly, a majority of Chinese now say that environmental protection should be
prioritized even if it comes at the expense of economic growth (Yu and Pugliese).
American policy makers are also in a heated debate about the current and future
foreign policy priorities of the United States. The Obama administration has dealt with an
array of distinct crises, from Syria to Egypt (Mearsheimer 9). According to Mearsheimer,
despite limited interests in most of these crises, the foreign policy establishment feels it
has to prioritize interventionism abroad for security (10). This is in spite of the fact that
the United States is very secure from a defense perspective (Mearsheimer 10). The
pursuit of global dominance through interventionism necessarily deprioritizes other goals
as it trades off with domestic economic development (Mearsheimer 10). Merry describes
American foreign policy as oriented toward “humanitarian interventionism” (5-6). Merry
indicates that this orientation is the favored option within the Obama administration in
spite of opposition from the American public (5-6).
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Americans, which have experienced a “scarcity” of economic growth in the past
several years, and a relative “abundance” of environmental protection, have different
concerns than the Chinese. The 2012 Chicago Council study found Americans put
climate change at the bottom of a list of nine threats to the United States, and near the
bottom of policy priorities for the United States (“Global Views” 8, 16). Preventing
terrorism and nuclear proliferation were at the top of the list of priorities in the Chicago
Council study (“Global Views” 16).
Both Chinese and American youth were asked to order a list of overall policies,
including domestic and foreign policy, as well as a list of just foreign policies in the order
of how they think they should be prioritized. The priorities with the greatest mean were
the highest priorities, while those with lowest mean were the lowest priorities. If a policy
had an equivalent mean, the list was sorted based on the lowest standard deviation as this
illustrates there was more agreement among participants regarding that particular policy.
Comparisons and Implications
Comparing the domestic and foreign policy priorities of American and Chinese
youth produces results that will be important when evaluating the direction of each
country in the coming decades. The following youth priorities are potentially indicative
of an internally focused shift for the United States and an outward looking shift for
China:


Chinese youth largely prioritize foreign policy over domestic policies



Chinese youth are willing to sacrifice economic growth for environmental
protection
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Both American and Chinese youth are interested in maintaining their country’s
military

Mean

Figure 11: Policy Priorities
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One of the most optimistic results is the overlapping commitment between
American and Chinese youth to improving international diplomacy and cooperation as
the first and second goal respectively (see figure 11). Both sides ranked this goal highly,
once again demonstrating that the potential for finding areas of cooperation will remain
strong in the coming years.
What is less promising for the Sino-U.S. relationship is a large commitment on
both sides to maintain military might. This was third on Chinese youth’s overall
priorities, and second on the American’s priorities. Greater buildup of arms will likely to
contribute to mistrust between both sides and potentially fuel an arms race. It is important
to note that while military superiority was listed as the second overall priority of
American youth, there was significant disagreement among respondents. The standard
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deviation of maintaining military superiority was nearly two, the highest on the list,
which indicates a split among American youth regarding U.S. military dominance. With
high levels of prioritization of international diplomacy and cooperation for both
American and Chinese youth, though, it appears that the will for cooperation exists, the
primary question is whether both sides will find substantive issues on which to cooperate.
On a list that contains domestic goals, such as a governmental safety net, the fact
that Chinese youth prioritized foreign policy goals to the extent they did is significant
because it demonstrates which side youth are leaning in the debate over domestic versus
foreign priorities. This may be indicative of Chinese youth looking outward toward
greater international influence, rather than prioritizing inward goals like a safety net and
civil liberties. This analysis is further supported by the fact that Chinese youth placed
maintaining military superiority as the third priority, another goal consistent with the idea
that Chinese youth are interested in influence outside of China. This inward-outward
distinction will be further explored in the following chapter.
For the Chinese youth, one domestic policy that overcame the importance of all
other foreign policies was the protection of the environment. The results of this research
show Chinese youth are prioritizing environmental protection over economic
development. In fact, the first priority on the list was protecting the environment and the
last priority was economic development. This conforms to Inglehart and Norris’
argument that the scarcity or surplus of specific areas of “human security” can influence
one’s prioritization. China’s consistent attainment of double-digit economic growth
created a surplus in economic security, whereas the environmental destruction required to
sustain such growth created scarcity in environmental security. Thus, Chinese youth
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prioritization of the environment is a natural development under Inglehart and Norris’
framework.

Figure 12: Foreign Policy Priorities
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When asked to rank their foreign policy priorities, Chinese youth had several
goals consistent with the current government and a few that contrasted (see figure 12).
For instance, the first goal on the list was preserving China’s alliances. China has only
one official alliance with North Korea and participates in the Shanghai Cooperative
Organization. It also has an array of unofficial alliances throughout the world. However,
the prioritization of Chinese youth of alliances reflects a desire among some in China to
use alliances as a strategic mechanism for international influence (Trigkas). Nonetheless,
pursuing official alliances is still controversial among many Chinese elites because it
conflicts with their rhetoric of non-alignment (Trigkas). One Chinese focus group
participant demonstrated this sentiment, saying “China is currently defensive with its
military. They should become more active and find allied countries.”
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For Chinese youth, “restraining enemy countries” was on the bottom half of the
list of priorities. This shows that Chinese youth may wish to counter the China threat
theory described by Pan of an intentional negative portrayal of China (23) while still
pursuing international influence through less threatening mechanisms, like alliances
rather than direct military posturing. American youth were far more interested in this
goal, with an overwhelming number placing “restraining enemy countries” as the first
priority, which may be a reaction to the large number of threats that American youth
perceive. Since the majority of Americans did not label China an explicit enemy, this is
not necessarily a cause for concern for the Sino-U.S. relationship. If China and the United
States find a mutual foe, cooperating to contain such a threat could provide a potential
area for cooperation due to the high level of American interest in this goal.
Improving the global environment was second on the list of foreign policy goals
for Chinese youth, which is encouraging for those hoping for Chinese influence in
pushing a global climate change regime. However, their American counterparts were less
enthusiastic about protecting the global environment as a foreign policy goal. This gap in
enthusiasm over protecting the environment likely means that China will have to
convince Americans that preserving the global environment is in their interest in order to
induce long-term cooperation over this goal.
One interesting element for Chinese youth was that they placed securing global
human rights higher than they placed preserving their own domestic civil liberties. This
may be reflective of Chinese youth attempting to promote a positive international image
of China through prioritizing human rights abroad, while understanding that it will be
difficult to prioritize domestically. There are a couple of important caveats to this
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statistic. First, this does not mean Chinese youth are willing to defy international law in
attempting to stop human rights violations, as a solid majority rejected doing so. Second,
this also does not mean they are disinterested in protecting their own civil liberties just
because it had a low prioritization. When asked if Chinese citizens should sacrifice some
civil liberties for national security, a solid majority rejected this idea. This runs counter to
the Chinese government’s current prioritization of stability over civil rights.
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CHAPTER 6

A NEW WORLD ORDER

The Multipolar Moment
The 2014 Chicago Council survey found that the number of Americans that said
the United States should stay out of world affairs was the largest on record, at 41 percent
(Smeltz 7). When Pew asked whether the United States should mind its own business, 52
percent said they agreed (“U.S. Foreign”). At the same time, the NIC predicts that the
world will become multipolar, ultimately making international governance more difficult
(48). Merry argues that Americans are shifting from global interventionism to internal
nationalism as an ideological counterweight (8). As noted above, scholars have differing
opinions about the likelihood of a grand shift in the current world order, and also have
radically different opinions of how the United States and China should react to this
potential shift.
As the world changes, so does China. Traditionally China has clung to
Westphalian ideals of strict adherence to sovereignty and non-interference in other states’
affairs, largely to lend to credibility to its complaints against the United States and others
interfering in “their affairs” (NIC 57). However, China is slowly shifting away from this
rigid approach, as it involves itself in peacekeeping missions and other international
efforts (NIC 57).
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If the world transitions to a multipolar order, this could have significant
implications for multilateral institutions since it may become more difficult to gather
consensus without a dominant power (NIC 48, 57). Some argue it is important for the
United States to accommodate a rising China to ensure a preservation of the existing
multilateral order (Geeraerts). This system gives states a non-violent outlet to voice
grievances against larger states and prevent larger states from exercising their dominance
in an exploitative manner, such as through multilateral monitoring and sanctions (Lake
477-478). Luckily for the maintenance of the multilateral order, many analysts believe
that as it currently stands, China will integrate into these multilateral institutions since it
has so far had positive experiences in these regimes (Sohn 78). China’s push for the
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement suggest that China is attempting to expand rather than
limit multilateralism (Kuik 109-110). Even when China attempts to shape the multilateral
order in its image, it does so in an incredibly cautious manner (Wuthnow et al. 284). The
NIC also contends that China does not wish to replace the international system, it just
wants a greater role as its global influence rises (105). As such, it appears China’s current
trajectory is to increase its global involvement but not at the expense of the world order.

Comparisons and Implications
In comparing youth in China and America, what stands out first is the number of
“optimists” in China, and the number of “pessimists” in the United States. In this
research, those classified as optimists chose “very likely” and pessimists chose “very
unlikely” to at least one of the following: Over the next two decades either America’s
influence will significantly decline, China will have the greatest global influence, China
will have the biggest economy, or China will have the most powerful military. In general,
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Chinese youth’s belief of China’s ascension, and American youth’s perception of
America’s decline has influenced the preferred policy direction of both sides:


Majorities of both sides’ youth disagree with increasing military spending, but
American youth more strongly lean in this direction



Chinese youth are much more likely to perceive their country as crucial to global
stability than American youth



Strong majorities of both sides’ youth would prefer to focus on domestic issues
before international issues, but Chinese youth were more split than Americans



Pessimistic American youth were more likely to turn inward in their policy
preferences while optimistic Chinese youth turned outward

FIGURE 13:
LEVELS OF OPTIMISM
Chinese Youth (n=141)

5%

11%

28%

32%

American Youth (n=150)

OPTIMISTS

PESSIMISTS

For China’s youth, their greater level of optimism translates into expanding
China’s influence beyond its current state. For American youth, their pessimism has
meant a preference toward a diminished role for America in international relations,
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especially in military contexts. Among the overall respondents, in nearly every way,
Chinese youth were more willing to engage in policies that would expand China’s
international influence than were American youth. This data begins to answer Beckley’s
question of how American youth’s pessimistic attitudes affect their policy preferences.
Additionally, the data provides insight into how Chinese youth’s optimism affects their
policy preferences as well.

FIGURE 14:
IS THE US KEY TO INTERNATIONAL
STABILITY BASED ON OPTIMISM
American Pessimists (n=45)

11%

22%

21%

40%

49%

57%

American Optimists (n=11)

SOMEWHAT - STRONGLY
DISAGREE

NO OPINION

SOMEWHAT - STRONGLY
AGREE

This research finds that greater pessimism among American youth correlates with
more inward-looking policies, the opposite result that Beckley had desired (77). For
Chinese youth the inverse result is true: Increased optimism among Chinese youth
correlated with increased willingness to engage the international community (see figure
14). For example, American youth that were pessimistic were more likely to believe the
United States is not crucial to international stability. This seems to suggest a relationship
between one’s predictions of future global developments, and how American youth view
the importance of the United States internationally. Overall, the specific policy
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preferences were similar between optimists and pessimists in both the United States and
China. However, their relative optimism or pessimism did influence the strength of these
preferences for these groups. That is, greater pessimism diminished both sides’ support
for international engagement, and greater optimism increased their support for this
engagement.
These attitudes and preferences are likely impacted by the substantially different
contexts experienced by Chinese and American youth. American youth have witnessed
the United States’ deep involvement in international affairs, while Chinese youth are just
now experiencing China as a world power. As such, American youth feel more inclined
to relinquish a portion of its international participation, since they have so far experienced
an abundance of such engagement. At the same time, Chinese youth desire to expand this
engagement because China’s participation has been infrequent throughout its history.
Moreover, these relative perceptions are likely a result of the changing global power
distribution. With China’s international influence and power growing, and the perception
that the United States is growing weaker, the attitudes of both sides’ youth may be
reflective of such a power shift.

47

FIGURE 15:
YOUR COUNTRY SHOULD INCREASE
MILITARY SPENDING
Chinese Youth (n=103)

SOMEWHAT - STRONGLY
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UNDECIDED

12%

10%

11%

35%

55%

77%

American Youth (n=140)

SOMEWHAT - STRONGLY
AGREE

The fact that American youth were largely unified in rejecting increased military
spending showcases their attitudes regarding this shift in global power (see figure 15).
Chinese youth were more split on this proposal which reinforces the idea that powerbased factors have increased their desire for a stronger China. These attitudes are likely a
reflection of the current power gap between the U.S. and the rest of the world. There is
more less impetus for American youth to pursue military expenditures in order to erase
this gap, since they already feel a high degree of military security. Chinese youth were
also split as to whether China should involve itself in other countries’ conflicts, whereas
Americans were solidly against involvement. Moreover, Chinese youth were more
willing to participate in multilateral institutions than American youth. These results
further confirm that Chinese youth are not completely persuaded by the Westphalian
ideals adhered to by China in the past. One focus group participant illustrated this feeling
when she said, “[China] should take the responsibility of a great country.”
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Chinese Youth (n=114)

SOMEWHAT - STRONGLY
DISAGREE

8%

7%

5%

30%

62%

American Youth (n=135)

88%

FIGURE 16:
YOUR COUNTRY SHOULD FOCUS ON
DOMESTIC ISSUES BEFORE INTERNATIONAL
ISSUES

UNDECIDED

SOMEWHAT - STRONGLY
AGREE

The inward shift of the American youth was most clearly demonstrated in their
prioritization of domestic issues over international issues (see figure 16). When
specifically asked, the vast majority of American youth said their country should focus on
domestic affairs. While the majority Chinese youth also lean toward a domestically
oriented focus, there is a significant minority that will pull China outward.
These relative attitudes of American and Chinese youth invert what many
observers believe are the current roles of the United States and China. Since the end of
the Cold War, the United States has been considered the world’s global hegemon, with all
of the accompanying benefits and obligations. By contrast, on the world stage, China is
known for declaring the inviolability of sovereignty and preaching the virtue of noninterference in other states’ affairs. It seems that those roles may be at least slightly
altered by the next generation of youth on both sides.
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This research also begins to address Beckley’s question of what policy
preferences correlate with optimistic and pessimistic attitudes (77). Beckley indicated
that American’s pessimistic attitudes could generate either positive or negative outcomes
for America’s position in the world (77). Based on the responses in this survey, the
opposite of Beckley’s desired outcome was the reality. That is to say, those that were
more pessimistic among the American youth had a greater tendency to focus on domestic
priorities at the expense of international engagement. The optimistic Chinese youth were
an inverse reflection of their American counterparts - they had a greater willingness to
engage the international community. Future research should explore the direction of
causality by asking: do policy preferences shape how one perceives the future, or does
one’s perception of the future shape policy preferences.
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CHAPTER 7

THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE

Creating Commonalities
Recent literature has begun exploring the link between multilingual abilities and
perceptions about the world. Often those that have learned more than one language are
also more likely to be tolerant of other societies and cultures. This is because language
can serve as a tool to provide commonalities in experience (Wong and Motha 62). As
such, understanding multiple languages can help individuals overcome xenophobia and
racism and shape how multilingual learners interact with the world (Wong and Motha
62). This research does not control for the specific second language participants had
studied, but rather whether they have studied a language for more than two years.
Ultimately, the attitudes and perceptions of Chinese and American language learners
helped legitimize Wong and Motha’s claims.
Comparisons and Implications
About 45 percent of American youth respondents could be classified as “language
learners” as they reported they had studied a language for more than two years. The rest
said they had studied a maximum of two years or less. Chinese youth were far more
likely than their American counterparts to learn an additional language to their mother
tongue. About 81 percent of Chinese youth said they learned a language for more than
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two years and the rest said they had studied a maximum of two years. For both
American and Chinese youth, learning an additional language appears to provide benefits
to a stable Sino-U.S. relationship. Unlike media exposure to news about Sino-U.S.
relationship, which had a negative impact on mutual perceptions and had no impact on
willingness to cooperate, language leaning not only correlated with increased positive
perceptions, but also improved the willingness to cooperate for both:


Both sides’ language learners were more likely to label the other country a
“partner”



Both sides’ non-language learners were more likely to label the other
country an enemy



Both sides’ language learners were more willing to engage in economic
cooperation

FIGURE 17:
CHINA SHOULD INCREASE ECONOMIC
COOPERATION WITH THE US BASED ON
LANGUAGE
Chinese Monolingual (n=14)

SOMEWHAT - STRONGLY
DISAGREE
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35%

64%

84%

Chinese Multilingual (n=89)

UNDECIDED
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SOMEWHAT - STRONGLY
AGREE

While the majority of both non-language learners and language learning Chinese
agreed with the idea of increasing economic cooperation with the United States, there
was a substantial increase in willingness to cooperate if the surveyed subjects had studied
another language.

FIGURE 18:
US SHOULD INCREASE ECONOMIC
COOPERATION WITH CHINA BASED ON
LANGUAGE
American Monolingual (n=71)
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DISAGREE
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American Multilingual (n=56)

UNDECIDED

SOMEWHAT - STRONGLY
AGREE

For American youth, there was also a significant correlation in their willingness to
cooperate in the economic realm with China. Although the correlation was not as
dramatic as it was for their Chinese counterpart. Those with the ability to speak more
than one language may be more likely to consider the positive economic benefits of
cooperating with foreign countries over economics. However it is not just economic
considerations that language impacts. Increased language learning also correlated with
both sides’ youth becoming more willing to cooperate on military affairs as well.
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FIGURE 19:
IS CHINA A PARTNER OR ENEMY BASED ON
LANGUAGE
American Monolingual (n=66)
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55%

American Multilingual (n=61)

PARTNER

NEITHER

ENEMY

The greater willingness to cooperate on military and economic affairs is perhaps
explained by the increased positive perceptions for both American and Chinese language
learners compared to non-language learners. Exposure to additional languages increases
the likelihood of exposure to positive experiences with foreigners, which may explain the
correlation between language learning and positive perceptions.
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FIGURE 20:
IS THE US A PARTNER OR ENEMY BASED ON
LANGUAGE
Chinese Monolingual (n=21)

PARTNER

NEITHER
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27%

64%

76%

Chinese Multilingual (n=106)

ENEMY

This study cannot provide insight as to whether those that are more inclined to
positive perceptions of other cultures, like China, are also more likely to take language in
the first place, or if exposure to other languages is what helped precipitate their positive
outlook. However, the consistent and significant differences for both American and
Chinese youth seem to suggest it is at least partially the latter. Learning other languages
also provides exposure to the ideas, history and cultures of other countries, thus providing
a foundation for greater understanding. Based on these results, greater U.S. investment in
Chinese language training and student exchange between Americans and Chines youth
may produce a more cooperative Sino-U.S. relationship and promote mutual
understanding.
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CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION
As this generation’s youth prepares to enter positions of leadership tomorrow both
the United States and China will experience dramatic changes in their bilateral
relationship as well as their international standing. This may be the result of a
combination of real shifts in the relative power of America and China as well as
perceptual shifts among the populations in both countries, in particular among the youth.
These perceptual shifts have created a generation of Chinese youth optimistic about
China’s rise and a generation of American pessimists toward America’s decline. These
shifts in perception have induced a reorientation of how youth believe their country
should formulate their foreign and domestic policies. Chinese youth are relatively more
interested in expanding China’s influence abroad, while American youth are ready to
scale back some of America’s obligations -- particularly in the military realm. However,
Chinese and American youth are not necessarily responding to the shift in the
international system with a desire to aggressively buildup their arms, since majorities
reject greater military spending and affirm multilateral participation. Additionally,
China’s ascent will not necessary remake the Western international system, and
America’s descent will not necessarily entail its withdrawal from multilateral
engagement. The attitudes of these youth seem to predict a more nuanced outcome - one
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where China takes a greater role in the existing world system, and America draws back
on some of its military commitments.
Maintaining the Sino-U.S. relationship will require a delicate balance on both
sides. Since China is seeking a greater role in the international system, the United States
will have to become more accommodating toward China’s participation if it wants to
maintain or improve its relationship to the greatest extent possible. Moreover, Chinese
youth are likely to particularly focus on provocative actions from the United States due to
their focus on America as China’s biggest state threat, such as the U.S. pivot to Asia, or
arms sales to Taiwan. This is especially dangerous since both American and Chinese
youth believe the other is willing to utilize military force. The United States will have to
ensure it takes extra caution in crafting its policy toward China so as not to create
scenarios susceptible to miscalculation and conflict. Even with these challenges, there are
an array of areas where cooperation can overcome mutual suspicions. Majorities of both
were willing to engage in economic cooperation, but American youth were disinterested
in military cooperation. And both prioritized international diplomacy as a policy goal.
These seemingly contradictory trends paint a picture similar to the status quo. The
bilateral relationship will remain complex, tense and suspicions will remain, but youth on
both sides have the desire to continue cooperation regardless.
Simply exposing Chinese and American youth to media regarding the other
country is not a successful strategy in improving positive perceptions. In fact, greater
media exposure is more likely to negatively impact mutual perceptions than to improve
them. An effective strategy for integrating Chinese and American youth and maintaining
the bilateral relationship in the future is increased language exchange and study abroad
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opportunities for both sides. This research has demonstrated that increased language
learning correlates with improved cross-country images perceptions and an increased
willingness to embrace cooperation.
This study could be improved by expanding responses to improve the likelihood
that the results are fully reflective of youth in both countries. Moreover, including
American focus groups as well would help provide context to the American side of the
data. As stated in the limitation section, ensuring that participation is not limited based on
internet access would help make sure the data is not skewed toward those that are more
affluent.
There are many areas that can be further explored to add to this research. Future
studies should control for whether language learning improves perceptions of other
cultures, or whether those that are more tolerant of other cultures are predisposed to
language learning. This could be pursued through following language learners before and
after learning a second language and then determining if their perceptions changed after
taking language classes for a period of time. Additionally, determining whether there is a
difference in perceptions based on what language a student is learning may be another
avenue for research. For example, Americans learning Mandarin may be especially
inclined to have positive perceptions of China. Future studies could also determine
whether there is a difference in perception based on whether respondents receive most of
their information from social media or traditional media platforms. Finally, questions
could be expanded to include demographic questions to determine if education, class, or
region had an effect on attitudes.
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This research provides insight into an often overlooked aspect of international
relations. The dispositions of youth provide unique insight into the future of the SinoU.S. relationship. To determine how well the findings of this research reflects other
studies’ findings on this subject, the conclusions should be compared to research of the
general public and academic opinion in both countries, as well as specific research that
compares Chinese and American youth. There is a growing academic and public
consensus that, in the future, China will take on a greater role in international affairs
while America’s role diminishes (Dugan; NIC 98-99). The dispositions of youth in this
survey conform to the general public’s view and the breadth of literature that predicts
China’s rise and America’s descent. Chinese youth in this survey also reflected a trend in
Chinese foreign policy circles toward partial abandonment of non-interference in other
states’ affairs. American youth are aligned with the general American public, which has
been skeptical of foreign policy adventurism (Merry 5-6), and at the same time reject the
foreign policy establishment which consistently endorses military interventions
(Mearsheimer 10). This appears to be part of an attitudinal shift inward in the literature,
since the American youth in this survey agreed with the general public which
increasingly thinks the United States should stay out of world affairs (Smeltz 7). It
appears the opinions of youth in China and the United States are essentially exaggerated
forms of the trends in opinion seen among the general public; the current attitudes of
youth in the United States and China can provide a window into the future, illustrating
how this shift in global power is affecting the next generation’s attitudes.
This research contains significant similarities and some differences with one study
that also compared Chinese and American youth. Shostya and Morreale interviewed
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youth in both countries and found that like youth in this study, a majority of both thought
China is gaining strength relative to the United States, and both sides were willing to
pursue economic cooperation (196-197, 194). One key difference is that American youth
were more optimistic that the United States will retain its economic lead than those
surveyed in this study (Shostya and Morreale 193). While this study measured second
language ability and its relationship with perception, Shostya and Morreale analyzed
tourism between America and China and its ability to improve perceptions. Their analysis
found that Chinese and American youth visiting their counterpart’s country improved
impressions of the other state (Shostya and Morreale 196), similar to the effect of
learning a second language.
The youth in this survey also fit well in the framework established by Inglehart
and Norris, which described the differing conceptions of security based on context (91).
Chinese youth were more oriented toward environmental protection, while American
youth desired greater economic growth. In this area, the attitudes of Chinese youth align
with the general public in China, which also increasingly prioritize environmental
protection (Gardner). As such, it appears youth priorities are largely determined by the
context of their upbringing.
Dramatic shifts in the international system can be complex and may often seem
contradictory. Youth opinion in the world’s two greatest superpowers not only helps
provide insight into the changing Sino-U.S. relationship but also enables policy makers to
make education predictions on how each state will respond to this power shift in the
future. In order to ensure a stable transition to the new world order, policymakers must
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take proactive steps to assess how other powers will react to these changes in relative
power.

61

Works Cited
Ash, Alec. "China's Youth: Do They Dare to Care about Politics?" Dissent 60.2 (2013):
41-45. Web.
Beckley, Michael. "China's Century?" International Security 36.3 (2011): 41-78.
Academic Search Complete. Web. 23 Sept. 2014.
Brock, Adam. “Will Chinese Replace English as the Global Language?” Voice of
America. Web. 13 Dec. 2014.
Camarota, Steven and Karen Zeigler. “One in Five U.S. Residents Speaks Foreign
Language at Home, Record 61.8 million.” Center for Immigration Studies. Web.
Oct. 2014.
Carlson, Allen, and Xiao Ren. New Frontiers in China's Foreign Relations = Zhongguo
Waijiao De Xin Bianjiang. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2011. Print.
"Global Views 2012." (2012): 1-88. The Chicago Council on Global
Affairs, 27 July 2012. Web.
CIRCLE. “The Civic Mission of Schools.” Carnegie Corporation of New York and
CIRCLE, 2003.
Dugan, Andrew. "Americans View China Mostly Unfavorably." Gallup, 20 Feb. 2014.
Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Dupont, Alan. "An Asian Security Standoff." National Interest 119 (2012): 55.
MasterFILE Premier. Web. 23 Sept. 2014.

62

Flanagan, Constance, and Peter Levine. "Civic Engagement And The Transition To
Adulthood." Future Of Children 20.1 (2010): 159-179. Academic Search
Complete. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Friedberg, Aaron L. "Hegemony With Chinese Characteristics." National Interest 114
(2011): 18. MasterFILE Premier. Web. 23 Sept. 2014.
Geeraerts, Gustaaf. "China, the EU, and the New Multipolarity." European Review 19.01
(2011): 57-67. Web.
Hatemi, Peter K., et al. "Genetic And Environmental Transmission Of Political Attitudes
Over A Life Time." Journal Of Politics 71.3 (2009): 1141-1156. Academic
Search Complete. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Horowitz, Juliana, Katie Simmons, Jacob Poushter, Aaron Ponce, Cathy Barker, and Kat
Devlin. "America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s." Ed.
Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, James Bell, Andrew Kohut, and Elizabeth Gross.
Pew Research Center (2013): n. pag. Pew Global. 18 July 2013. Web.
IHS. "China to Become World’s Largest Economy in 2024 Reports IHS Economics." IHS
Online Pressroom, 7 Sept. 2014. Web.
Inglehart, Ronald F., and Pippa Norris. "The Four Horsemen Of The Apocalypse:
Understanding Human Security." Scandinavian Political Studies 35.1 (2012): 7196. Academic Search Complete. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.

63

Juan, Zhang, and Pál Nyiri. "'Walled' Activism: Transnational Social Movements And
The Politics Of Chinese Cyber-Public Space." International Development
Planning Review 36.1 (2014): 111-131. Academic Search Complete. Web. 21
Nov. 2014.
Kahne, Joseph, and Ellen Middaugh. "Digital Media Shapes Youth Participation in
Politics." Phi Delta Kappan 94 (2012.): 52-56. Nov. 2012. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Nichols, John. "America's Youth Uprising." Nation 294.10 (2012): 4-6. Academic Search
Complete. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Knecht, Thomas. Paying Attention to Foreign Affairs: How Public Opinion Affects
Presidential Decision Making. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 2010.
Print.
Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. "Multilateralism In China's ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution,
Characteristics, And Aspiration." Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal Of
International & Strategic Affairs27.1 (2005): 102-122. Academic Search
Complete. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Lake, David A. "Making America Safe For The World: Multilateralism And The
Rehabilitation Of US Authority." Global Governance 16.4 (2010): 471-484.
Academic Search Complete. Web. 23 Sept. 2014.
Layne, Christopher. "The Global Power Shift From West To East." National Interest 119
(2012): 21. MasterFILE Premier. Web. 23 Sept. 2014.

64

Li, Qingsi. "论美国的亚洲政策及其影响." Journal of Shangqu Teachers College26.5
(2010): 1-5. Web.
Luo, Yunjuan. "The Internet and Agenda Setting in China: The Influence of Online
Public Opinion on Media Coverage and Government Policy." International
Journal of Communication 8 (2014): 1289-312. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Mearsheimer, John J. "America Unhinged." National Interest 129 (2014): 9. MasterFILE
Premier. Web. 23 Sept. 2014.
Merry, Robert W. "America's Default Foreign Policy." National Interest 127 (2013): 5.
MasterFILE Premier. Web. 23 Sept. 2014.
Nathan, Andrew J., and Andrew Scobell. "How China Sees America." Foreign
Affairs 91.5 (2012): 32-47. Academic Search Complete. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
NCUSCR. "American and Chinese Views on the World – and Each Other." N.p., n.d.
Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
NIC. "Global Trends 2030." National Intelligence Council, 10 Dec. 2012. Web. 21 Nov.
2014.
Niv-Solomon, Anat, et al. "Talking Security: A Cross-Cultural, Cross-Generational
Analysis." Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (2007): 1-44.
Academic Search Complete. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Pan, Chengxin. "Discourses of 'China' in International Relations: A Study in Western
Theory as (IR) Practice." Thesis. The Australian National University,
2004. OpenThesis. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
65

Perlez, Jane. "In China and U.S., Mutual Distrust Grows, Study Finds." The New York
Times. The New York Times, 17 July 2013. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Qiu, Bin. "美国的亚洲地缘政治战略与中国的选择." Journal of Jiangxi Institute of
Education 24.1 (2003): 11-36. Web.
Repnikova, Maria. "Domestic Factors in China’s International Relations Discourse:
Chinese Debates on the Role of Public Opinion." The Asan Forum. N.p., 21 Mar.
2014. Web.
Shambaugh, David. "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes And Efficacy."
China Journal 57 (2007): 25-58. Academic Search Complete. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Shengluo, Chen. "Survey Study on Chinese University Students' Perceptions of the
Political Systems of China and the United States." Chinese Education & Society
44.2 (2011): 13-57. Web.
Shostya, Anna, and Joseph Morreale. "U.S.-China Economic And Political Relations:
Youths' Perceptions." International Advances In Economic Research 20.2 (2014):
189. MasterFILE Premier. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Smeltz, Dina, Ivo Daalder, and Craig Kafura. "Foreign Policy in the Age of
Retrenchment." The Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2014): n. pag. Web. 31
Dec. 2014.
<http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/survey/2014/_resources/ChicagoCouncilSurv
ey.pdf>.

66

Sohn, Injoo. "After Renaissance: China’S Multilateral Offensive In The Developing
World1." European Journal Of International Relations 18.1 (2012): 77101. Academic Search Complete. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Trigkas, Vasilis. "Is China A Lonely Diva?" The Diplomat. N.p., 3 Sept. 2014. Web. 20
Nov. 2014.
"U.S.-CHINA SECURITY PERCEPTIONS." Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace (2013): n. pag. China Strategic Culture Promotion Association. Web. 31
Dec. 2014.
<http://carnegieendowment.org/files/us_china_security_perceptions_report.pdf>.
“U.S. Foreign Policy: Key Data Points from Pew Research." Pew Research Center RSS.
N.p., 06 Jan. 2014. Web. 29 Dec. 2014. <http://www.pewresearch.org/key-datapoints/u-s-foreign-policy-key-data-points/>.
"U.S. Public, Experts Differ on China Policies." Pew Research Centers Global Attitudes
Project RSS. Ed. Jessica Mathews, Andrew Kohut, and J. Stapleton Roy. N.p., 18
Sept. 2012. Web. 05 Dec. 2014.
Wallis, Cara. "New Media Practices in China: Youth Patterns, Processes, and
Politics." International Journal of Communication [Online], 5 (2011): 31. Web.
20 Nov. 2014.
Weiss, Thomas G. "Renewing Washington's Multilateral Leadership." Global
Governance 18.3 (2012): 253-266. Academic Search Complete. Web. 23 Sept.
2014.
67

Wong, Shelley, and Suhanthie Motha. "Multilingualism In Post-9/11 U.S. Schools:
Implications For Engaging Empire." Peace & Change 32.1 (2007): 62-77.
Academic Search Complete. Web. 4 Nov. 2014.
Wuthnow, Joel, Xin Li, and Lingling Qi. "Diverse Multilateralism: Four Strategies In
China's Multilateral Diplomacy." Journal Of Chinese Political Science 17.3
(2012): 269-290. Academic Search Complete. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Yang, KW (2007). Organizing MySpace: Youth walkouts, pleasure, politics and new
media. Educational Foundations. 21 (1-2), 9-28.
Yohalem, Nicole, and Shanetta Martin. "Building the Evidence Base for Youth
Engagement: Reflections on Youth and Democracy." Journal of Community
Psychology 35.6 (2007): 807-10. Web. 20 Nov. 2014.
"Youth Voting." CIRCLE. N.p., 11 Nov. 2014. Web. 20 Nov. 2014.
Yu, Daniela, and Anita Pugliese. "Majority of Chinese Prioritize Environment Over
Economy." Gallup, 8 June 2012. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.
Zhang, Xinzhi. "Political Participation in an Unlikely Place: How Individuals Engage in
Politics through Social Networking Sites in China." International Journal of
Communication 8 (2014): 21-42. Web. 21 Nov. 2014.

68

69

